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I.  INTRODUCTION 
“Antonio Romero is what my mother calls me.  Antonio Romero is also how I 
am known to many of my friends and family members.  Unfortunately, the name 
Antonio Romero also appears on a U.S. Treasury Department list titled ‘Specially 
Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons.’”1
Imagine you are the director of a non-profit charitable organization.  You and 
your staff are dedicated to providing health and welfare services to your community.  
The government has instructed you to investigate the background of all your 
employees by annually comparing their names to a U.S. terrorist watch list.  To your 
surprise, you discover a key member of your staff has a name that matches a name 
on the list.  Is this employee a terrorist?  Should you tell him his name matches a 
name on this list?  Should you turn his name over to the government, despite the fact 
that you know this terrorist watch list is plagued with error?2  The American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU) would have faced this very dilemma had it followed a 
requirement implemented by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) calling for 
the ACLU and other organizations to compare the names of their employees to 
names on terrorist watch lists as a condition of participation in a national charity 
drive.3  Had the ACLU followed the mandate, it would have discovered the name of 
its executive director, Anthony “Antonio” Romero, listed on the Department of 
Treasury’s Specially Designated Nationals List.4   
The Combined Federal Campaign (CFC) is an annual charity drive in which 
federal employees make charitable donations to non-profit organizations through 
payroll deductions.5  In October 2003, the federal government began requiring non-
                                                                
1Anthony D. Romero, You, Too, Could be a Suspected Terrorist, WASH. POST, Aug. 17, 
2004, at A15.  Anthony “Antonio” Romero is the Executive Director of the ACLU and has the 
misfortune of having his name appear on a terrorist watch list.  Romero is not a terrorist, nor is 
he suspected of transacting with terrorists. 
2Eric Lichtblau, Papers Show Confusion As Watch List Grew Quickly, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 
2004, at A9. 
3Brad Wolverton, Federal Campaign Flap, THE CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Aug. 19, 2004, at 
11. 
4Romero, supra note 1. 
5Adam Liptak, A.C.L.U. Board is Split Over Terror Watch Lists, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 
2004, at A1.   
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profit organizations that receive funds through the CFC to compare the names of 
their employees against the names on terrorist watch lists and then notify the federal 
government of any matches.6  If an organization refuses to abide by this mandate, it 
is prohibited from soliciting and receiving donations through the CFC.7   
This new requirement presents a question of first impression for the courts.  
When the issue makes its way into a courtroom,8 the courts may be tempted to follow 
the analysis of Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund 9 by 
considering the issue under the public forum doctrine of the First Amendment.10  
This note recommends that the courts refrain from a First Amendment analysis and 
instead consider the new requirement under the doctrine of unconstitutional 
conditions.   
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions prohibits the government from 
affording a gratuitous benefit on the condition that the beneficiary relinquish a 
constitutional right.11  For example, when Congress attempted to condition 
distribution of federal grant dollars on an educational broadcasting station’s 
willingness to cease editorializing, the Supreme Court ruled that Congress had 
imposed an unconstitutional condition on the station’s right to free speech.12 The 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine prevents the Government from “subtly 
pressuring citizens, whether purposely or inadvertently, into surrendering their 
rights.”13   
The following analysis of the new CFC requirement under the doctrine of 
unconstitutional conditions reveals that the federal government is conditioning a 
benefit—participation in the CFC—on the participating organizations’ willingness to 
surrender their Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches of 
private business records.  Because this is exactly the type of government abuse the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine is intended to prevent, the courts should declare 
this condition unconstitutional and prohibit the OPM from further enforcing the rule. 
The new CFC requirement presents a compelling opportunity for the courts to 
develop the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.  The Supreme Court first 
invoked the doctrine to remedy the problem of state acts that conditioned economic 
privileges on a corporations’ willingness to surrender constitutional rights.14  A half-
                                                                
6Id. 
7Id. 
8Jacqueline L. Salmon, Groups Sue OPM on Terrorism Rule; Charities Told to Screen 
Workers, WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 2004, at A35 (reporting that 13 national organizations filed 
suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia to block enforcement of the new 
Campaign requirement).  
9473 U.S. 788 (1985). 
10Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 797. 
11Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1415, 1415 
(1989) (citing to Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583 (1926) and W. 
Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas ex rel. Coleman, 216 U.S. 1 (1910)). 
12FCC  v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984). 
13Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303, 1324-25 (11th Cir. 2004).   
14Sullivan, supra note 11, at 1416.  
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century later, the Court employed the doctrine to bar government measures that 
restricted individual liberties.15  The new CFC requirement triggers a new use for the 
doctrine: a government act that suppresses one individual right as a condition of 
exercising another.  Although the context of this new requirement varies from the 
“classic” unconstitutional condition fact pattern, it poses the very same question that 
the doctrine was created to resolve: the constitutionality of a government act that 
suppresses citizens’ rights.  For this reason, the doctrine of unconstitutional 
conditions is the appropriate framework for analyzing the constitutionality of the 
new CFC requirement. 
This note addresses the question of whether a federal agency operating under the 
authority of the executive branch can constitutionally condition the right to 
participate in the CFC on agreement to voluntarily search private business records, 
an act ordinarily subject to the Fourth Amendment requirement of judicial review.  
The analysis is organized into six sections.  Part II explores the history of the CFC, 
the campaign’s new requirement, and the development and use of terrorist watch 
lists.  Part III examines Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund,16 
the sole Supreme Court opinion analyzing constitutional issues arising under the 
CFC.  Although Cornelius is relevant for the present analysis in that the Court 
determined participation in the CFC is protected speech, Part III makes clear that the 
new CFC requirement is distinguishable from the facts in Cornelius and, therefore, 
requires consideration under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine rather than the 
First Amendment.   
Parts IV and V scrutinize the new requirement under the doctrine of 
unconstitutional conditions.  Part IV details the history and the analytical framework 
of the doctrine, and Part V presents the analysis.  Part VI unearths further 
justifications for expanding the use of the doctrine, specifically that the CFC 
condition is particularly malignant, the Constitution protects equally in times of war 
and peace, and the terrorist watch lists are wholly unreliable.  Part VII concludes that 
the CFC’s new requirement of conditioning the exercise of one right on the 
submission of another right is an unconstitutional condition and the courts should bar 
continued enforcement of the rule. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Combined Federal Campaign 
The CFC is an annual charity drive that provides federal employees with the 
opportunity to make monetary contributions to non-profit charitable organizations 
through payroll deductions.17  The CFC is administered by the OPM,18 an 
independent executive agency that oversees human resource matters for the 
                                                                
15Id. 
16473 U.S. 788 (1985). 
17Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 790. 
18U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, COMBINED FEDERAL CAMPAIGN 
REGULATIONS & GUIDANCE, available at http://www.opm.gov/cfc/opmmemos (last visited 
Aug. 1, 2005). 
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executive and legislative branches.19  Every year, non-profit organizations apply to 
participate in the program; the groups approved for participation are listed in a book 
distributed to all federal employees.20  The employees who elect to contribute to any 
of the listed organizations fill out a type of pledge card, designating the organizations 
they would like to support and the dollar amount they intend to contribute.21  This 
amount is then deducted from the employee’s paycheck and sent to the designated 
organizations.22  Ten thousand charities participate in the CFC, and over a million 
federal employees donate approximately $250 million annually through the 
program.23   
This federal workplace giving program was first brought to life under the 
Eisenhower Administration.24  Prior to 1957, charitable fundraising in the federal 
workplace was conducted on an ad hoc basis.25  Charitable organizations individually 
sought permission from various worksite managers to solicit funds from federal 
employees in their workplace.26  Due to the increasing number of groups seeking 
donations throughout the year, this fundraising process disrupted the work 
environment and raised the level of confusion among employees who were not 
always familiar with the different groups soliciting money.27  In 1957, President 
Eisenhower responded to this mayhem by creating an advisory committee to set forth 
uniform guidelines for charitable solicitations in the workplace, essentially the 
predecessor of the CFC.28   
In 1961, President Kennedy abolished the advisory committee created by 
Eisenhower and directed the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission to oversee 
fundraising in the federal workplace,29 the program that became known as the 
Combined Federal Campaign.30  The stated purpose of this newly designed program 
was to provide an opportunity for “national voluntary health and welfare agencies . . . to 
solicit funds from Federal employees and members of the armed forces at their 
places of employment . . . .”31  Over the next two decades, federal regulations were 
                                                                
19U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, OPM GOALS, available at 
http://www.opm.gov/html/goals.asp (last visited Aug. 1, 2005) [hereinafter OPM GOALS].  
20Plaintiff’s Complaint at 10-11, Am. Civil Liberties Union Found. v. United States Office 
of Pers. Mgmt. (D.D.C.) (No. 1:04cv1958) available at http://www. aclu.org/SafeandFree/ 
SafeandFree.cfm?ID=16984&c=206 (Aug. 1, 2005) [hereinafter ACLU Complaint]. 
21Id.  
22Id. 
23Wolverton, supra note 3. 
24Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 792. 
25Id. at 791. 
26Id. 
27Id. at 792. 
28Id.  
29Id. 
30ACLU Complaint, supra note 20, at 8. 
31Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 792 (citing Exec. Order No. 10,927, 3 C.F.R. 454 (1959-1963)). 
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implemented to govern the CFC, and in 1978, the OPM assumed the responsibility 
for administering the program.32  The CFC currently provides the only opportunity 
for charitable organizations to solicit federal employees at their place of work.33 
During the Reagan Administration, the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), joined by other legal defense 
organizations, filed three lawsuits challenging the manner in which the OPM 
administered the CFC.34 The first lawsuit successfully challenged the eligibility 
criteria used to determine which charitable organizations were qualified to 
participate in the CFC; the second lawsuit unsuccessfully challenged the manner by 
which the OPM distributed some of the funds collected through the CFC.35  In 
response to these first two legal challenges, President Reagan amended Kennedy’s 
1961 executive order in an effort to clarify both the purpose of the program and the 
manner in which it was to be administered.36  Reagan specified that the purpose of 
the CFC was to “support and facilitate fund-raising on behalf of voluntary agencies 
through on-the-job solicitations of Federal employees and members of the uniformed 
services, and to ensure that the recipient agencies are responsible in the uses of the 
moneys so raised.”37  Reagan granted the Director of the OPM the authority to 
determine which charitable groups satisfied the CFC eligibility requirements, and 
then limited the types of groups eligible to participate to “voluntary, charitable, 
health and welfare agencies that provide . . . direct . . . services to individuals or their 
families.” 38  This limited definition excluded legal defense organizations, like the 
NAACP, from participating in the CFC, and thus gave rise to the third legal 
challenge in Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund.39  
B. The New Requirement of the CFC 
In October 2003, the OPM began requiring non-profit organizations that receive 
funding through the CFC to “certify that they do not knowingly employ individuals 
or contribute funds to entities or persons on either the Department of Treasury’s 
Specially Designated Nationals List or the Terrorist Exclusion List.”40  The OPM 
                                                                
32Id. at 792-93. 
33ACLU Complaint, supra note 20, at 8. 
34Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 793. 
35Id. (referring to NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc. v. Campbell, 504 F.Supp. 1365 
(D.D.C. 1981) and NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc. v. Devine, 560 F.Supp. 667 
(D.D.C. 1983), respectively). 
36Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 795. 
37Exec. Order No. 12,353, 47 Fed. Reg. 12,785 (Mar. 25, 1982). 
38Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 794-95 (citing Exec. Order No. 12,353, 47 Fed. Reg. 12,785 
(Mar. 25, 1982)). 
39473 U.S. 788. 
40U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, CFC MEMORANDUM 2003-10 (Oct. 3, 2003), 
available at http://www.opm.gov/cfc/opmmemos/2003/2003-10.asp (last visited Aug. 1, 
2005).  See COMBINED FEDERAL CAMPAIGN, 2005 APPLICATION INSTRUCTIONS FOR NATIONAL/ 
INTERNATIONAL FEDERATIONS, NO. 3206-0131, at p. 4, available at http://www.opm.gov/cfc/ 
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explains that this new mandate is “required under the authority of Executive Order 
13,224 and OPM’s plenary authority to administer the CFC.”41  The agency further 
describes the requirement as following the best practices guidelines published by the 
U.S. Department of the Treasury.42
On September 25, 2001, President Bush signed Executive Order 13,224, 
prohibiting U.S. persons from transacting or dealing with individuals and entities 
controlled by or otherwise associated with specially designated terrorists.  This Order 
also blocks the property interests and assets of the named terrorists or terrorist 
supporters.43  In response to Executive Order 13,224, the Department of the Treasury 
blocked the assets of three charities believed to have ties to terrorist organizations.44   
Arab American and American Muslim charitable organizations, concerned about 
the prospect of having their assets blocked, subsequently sought guidance from the 
Treasury Department on how to avoid this type government interference in their 
activities.45  The Department published the U.S. Department of the Treasury Anti-
Terrorist Financing Guidelines: Voluntary Best Practices for U.S.—Based 
Charities46 (Treasury Guidelines) to advise charitable organizations on how to 
minimize the likelihood that their charitable funds would be diverted for terrorist 
activities.47  The Treasury Guidelines advise charities to engage in best practices, 
such as maintaining an appropriate governing structure and making public the names 
of members of the board of directors, key employees, and affiliate organizations that 
receive funding from the charity.48  Furthermore, charities are advised to maintain 
detailed personnel records of key employees, including home addresses and social 
                                                           
docs/2005nationalfederationapplication.doc (last visited Aug. 1, 2005).  See also Wolverton, 
supra note 3 (reporting on the new CFC requirement and the charities’ responses to the rule). 
41U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, CFC MEMORANDUM 2004-12 (Nov. 24, 
2004) available at http://www.opm.gov/cfc/opmmemos/2004/2004-12.asp (last visited Aug. 1, 
2005) [hereinafter CFC MEMORANDUM]. 
42Id. (referring to U.S. DEP’T. OF THE TREASURY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY 
ANTI-TERRORIST FINANCING GUIDELINES: VOLUNTARY BEST PRACTICES FOR U.S. – BASED 
CHARITIES, available at http://www.treas.gov/ press/releases/ docs/ tocc.pdf (last visited Aug. 
1, 2005)). 
43Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001). 
44CFC MEMORANDUM, supra note 41; Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing.: 
Hearing Testimony Before the House Fin. Servs. Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations, 
108th Cong. (June 16, 2004) (statement of R. Richard Newcomb, Dir., Office of Foreign 
Assets Control U.S. Dept. of the Treasury).  Newcomb testified that the Treasury Department 
blocked the assets of the Holy Land Foundation, the Benevolence International Foundation, 
and the Global Relief Foundation. 
45OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, PO-3607 (2002), available at 
http://www.treas.gov /press /releases/po3607.htm (Aug. 1, 2005). 
46OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, U.S. DEPT. OF THE 
TREASURY ANTI-TERRORIST FINANCING GUIDELINES: VOLUNTARY BEST PRACTICES FOR U.S. – 
BASED CHARITIES, available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/docs/tocc.pdf (last visited 
Aug. 1, 2005) [hereinafter TREASURY GUIDELINES].  
47OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, supra note 45. 
48TREASURY GUIDELINES, supra note 46, at 2. 
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security numbers.49  The Treasury Guidelines suggest that any U.S. charities that 
provide funding to foreign organizations verify that the foreign recipient does not 
appear on U.S. terrorist watch lists.50  What is notably absent from the Treasury 
Guidelines, however, is the very requirement that the OPM alleges to have adopted 
from these Guidelines—that charities engage in the ongoing practice of comparing 
names of employees against the names on the terrorist watch lists.51
In November, 2004, the OPM issued a memorandum advising charitable 
organizations on how to comply with the new CFC requirement.52  The 
memorandum provides that charities planning to participate in the CFC must, at a 
minimum, annually compare the names of their employees to two terrorist watch 
lists53 and sign a certification verifying that none of the names of their employees 
appear on these lists.54  If an organization determines that an employee has a name 
matching a name on one of the two lists, the organization may not sign the 
certification and will be denied participation in the CFC.55  Furthermore, if at 
anytime after the certification has been signed the organization determines that an 
employee has a name matching a name on one of the terrorist watch lists, the 
organization is to notify the OPM, and the agency will suspend disbursement of CFC 
funds.56
C.  Terrorist Watch Lists 
The term “terrorist watch list” is a catchall phrase referring to more than a dozen 
lists, maintained by nine federal agencies, containing names used by terrorists, 
suspected terrorists, or individuals who may know terrorists.57  While all the lists 
share the common purpose of curbing future terrorist acts, the specific purpose that 
each list serves and the procedure by which names are compiled vary among the 
federal agencies managing the lists.58  For example, the terrorist watch list 
maintained by the Transportation Safety Administration serves the purpose of 
                                                                
49Id. at 3. 
50Id. at 5. 
51See TREASURY GUIDELINES, supra note 46. 
52CFC MEMORANDUM, supra note 41. 
53Id.; see also Brad Wolverton, Federal Charity Drive Explains How Controversial Rule 
Works, THE CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Dec. 9, 2004, at 12. 
54CFC MEMORANDUM, supra note 41. 
55Id. 
56Id. 
57OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEPT. OF HOMELAND SEC., DHS CHALLENGES IN 
CONSOLIDATING TERRORIST WATCH LIST INFORMATION, OIG-04-31, at 4 (2004), available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/interweb /assetlibrary/OIG-04-31_Watch_List.pdf [hereinafter DHS 
INSPECTOR GEN. REPORT].  The report assesses the strengths and weaknesses of the 
Department’s statutorily mandated responsibility of consolidating the multiple watch lists 
maintained by different federal agencies.  Id.  One of the most alarming weaknesses identified 
by the Inspector General’s report is the lack of privacy with list management.  Id. 
58Id. 
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barring individuals thought to be terrorist threats from traveling on passenger 
airplanes.59  The terrorist watch list maintained by the Department of Treasury 
identifies individuals and organizations whose property is blocked in the U.S. and 
with whom U.S. citizens are barred from transacting.60  The Specially Designated 
Nationals List, maintained by the Department of the Treasury, and the Terrorist 
Exclusion List, maintained by the Department of State and the Department of Justice 
(collectively, “terrorist watch lists”) are the two lists the OPM requires charitable 
organizations to consult as a condition to receiving CFC funds.61
The reliability of these terrorist watch lists is questionable at best.  Many of the 
names on the lists lack specific identification information, such as a date of birth, 
social security number, or last known address.62  This lack of specificity leaves open 
the real possibility for misidentification.63  One of the more notable examples of a 
terrorist misidentification happened to Senator Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts.  
Between March 1 and April 6, 2004, airline employees tried to bar Senator Kennedy 
from boarding flights because “Edward Kennedy” appeared on a terrorist watch 
list.64  Unfortunately, if a name mistakenly appears on one of these terrorist watch 
lists or a name on a list matches that of an innocent person, the federal government 
has no effective procedure for either removing the name from the list or 
authenticating which specific individual the list is attempting to identify.65     
In addition to misidentification, the Department of Homeland Security Office of 
Inspector General identified individual privacy as a leading concern in the 
maintenance and consolidation of the various terrorist watch lists.66  Specifically, the 
Inspector General reported concerns with the Department of Homeland Security’s 
failure to implement an overarching privacy policy to govern the nine different 
                                                                
59Glenn Frankel & Sara Kehaulani Goo, U.S. Alert Prompts British Plane to Turn Back; 
Passenger Carrying French Passport Is Questioned in London and Released, WASH. POST, 
Jan. 13, 2005, at A16. 
60Watch Watch Lists; Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, SEC. INT. NEWS, Sept. 20, 2004. 
61CFC MEMORANDUM, supra note 41. 
62Ann Davis, Far Afield: FBI’s Post-Sept. 11 ‘Watch List’ Mutates, Acquires Life of Its 
Own, WALL ST. J., Nov. 19, 2002, at A1; Romero, supra note 1.  
63Romero, supra note 1; Rachel L. Swarns, Senator? Terrorist? A Watch List Stops 
Kennedy at Airport, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2004, at A1.  The ACLU researched a sample of 
names found on the Department of Treasury’s watch list to demonstrate the potential for 
misidentification:  “Juan M. Cruz” is also the name of a member of the Atlanta Braves and the 
name of over 100 individuals listed in Florida; “Charles Taylor” is also the name of a member 
of Congress and the name of a professor at Stanford University and a professor at 
Northwestern University; and “Oscar Hernandez” is also a name shared by more than 200 
individuals living in Texas and Florida.  This information is available at 
http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/Safeand Free.cfm?ID=16990&c=207 (last visited Aug. 1, 
2005).   
64Charlie Savage, No-Fly List Almost Grounded Kennedy, He Tells Hearing, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Aug. 20, 2004, at A2. 
65Plaintiff’s Complaint at 8, Green v. Transp. Sec. Admin. (D. Wash.), available at 
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/aclu/greenvtsa40604.cmp.pdf (last visited Aug. 1, 2005). 
66DHS INSPECTOR GEN. REPORT, supra note 57, at 27.  
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federal agencies maintaining terrorist watch lists.67  Given these reliability problems 
stemming from the compilation and maintenance of the terrorist watch lists, it is a 
wonder why the OPM is prepared to exclude CFC participation based on the 
accuracy, or inaccuracy, of these lists. 
III.  CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE COMBINED FEDERAL CAMPAIGN 
A.  Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund 
Both the acts of soliciting funds and contributing funds through the CFC are 
protected speech, governed by the public forum doctrine of the First Amendment.68  
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund69 held that the federal 
government did not violate the First Amendment by excluding legal defense and 
public advocacy groups from participating in the CFC.70  In Cornelius, the NAACP 
and other legal defense organizations brought an action against the OPM to 
challenge their threatened exclusion from the CFC after President Reagan limited 
participation in the CFC to “voluntary, charitable, health and welfare agencies that 
provide or support direct health and welfare services to individuals or their 
families.”71  Reagan explicitly excluded organizations that “seek to influence the 
outcomes of elections or the determination of public policy through political activity 
or advocacy, lobbying, or litigation on behalf of parties other than themselves.”72  As 
the Cornelius plaintiffs were all legal defense funds which influenced public policy 
through political activity, advocacy, lobbying and litigation, these groups stood to be 
excluded from continued participation in the CFC.73   
The Cornelius Court analyzed the CFC under the First Amendment’s public 
forum doctrine, a doctrine that provides an analytical framework for determining 
“when the Government’s interest in limiting the use of its property to its intended 
purpose outweighs the interest of those wishing to use the property for other 
purposes.”74  The Court determined that the CFC, not the federal workplace, was the 
forum in which speech took place75 and that the CFC was a “non-public forum.”76  
The government is afforded broad discretion in restricting speech in a non-public 
forum;77 speech regulations in a non-public forum need only be “reasonable,” as long 
                                                                
67Id. 
68Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 799. 
69473 U.S. 788. 
70Id. at 813.  
71Id. at 795 (citing Exec. Order No. 12,353, 47 Fed. Reg. 12,785 (Mar. 25, 1982)). 
72Id. 
73Id.  
74Id. at 800; see also O’Neill, infra note 77, at 284. 
75Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 801.  
76Id. at 806; see also O’Neill, infra note 77, at 286-87. 
77Kevin Francis O’Neill, A First Amendment Compass: Navigating the Speech Clause with 
a Five-Step Analytical Framework, 29 SW. U. L. REV. 225, 287 (2000). 
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as the government is not attempting to restrict the content of speech because it 
disagrees with the message.78  Upon recognizing that the purpose of excluding 
groups that engage in political advocacy, lobbying, or litigation was to minimize 
disruption in the workplace, Cornelius determined the government’s exclusion of 
these organizations from the CFC to be reasonable.79
B.  The CFC Requirement is Distinct From the Issue Addressed in Cornelius 
Until recently, the courts have not been presented with a constitutional question 
arising from the CFC since Cornelius.  On November 10, 2004, the ACLU along 
with twelve other organizations sued the OPM and the CFC Director on the grounds 
that the new CFC requirement is unconstitutional.80  The plaintiffs assert that the 
requirement violates their rights under the First and Fifth Amendments, specifying 
that the condition places “a vague, unreasonable, and unconstitutional burden on 
[their] expressive and associational activities.”81  
While the courts may be tempted to apply the First Amendment analysis used in 
Cornelius, the attendant facts do not invoke the same issues addressed in that 
opinion.  In Cornelius, the federal government excluded groups from participating in 
the CFC based on the manner by which these groups provided services.82  The issue 
before the Court was whether the federal government suppressed speech by 
excluding certain groups from the CFC.83  The present fact pattern is distinct from 
Cornelius in that the federal government is not implementing an outright exclusion 
of any particular group from participating in the CFC based on the manner in which 
an organization provides services.  Instead, the government is conditioning CFC 
participation on the group’s willingness to compare private employee lists to names 
on terrorist watch lists and to turn over the names of employees matching those 
names on the lists.84  The result of this factual distinction is that the CFC requirement 
is not placing an outright restriction on an organization’s free speech rights; rather, it 
is placing a condition on the privilege of exercising of those rights.  Thus, the issue is 
one of an unconstitutional condition rather than a direct infringement of free speech. 
                                                                
78Id. 
79Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 813. 
80Salmon, supra note 8.  The twelve additional plaintiffs are the Advocacy Institute in 
Washington, DC; Amnesty International USA in New York, NY; Asian American Legal 
Defense and Education Fund in New York, NY; Brennan Center for Justice at New York 
University School of Law in New York, NY; Electronic Frontier Foundation in San Francisco, 
CA; NAACP Special Contribution Fund in Baltimore, MD; NAACP Legal Defense and 
Educational Fund in New York, NY; Natural Resources Defense Council in New York, 
NY,;Focus Project d/b/a OMB Watch in Washington, DC; Our Bodies Ourselves in Boston, 
MA; People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals in Norfolk, VA; and the Unitarian 
Universalist Service Committee in Cambridge, MA.  See ACLU Complaint, supra note 20, at 
1-2.   
81ACLU Complaint, supra note 20, at 26. 
82Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 795. 
83Id. at 797. 
84Wolverton, supra note 3. 
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IV.  THE DOCTRINE OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS 
A.  Background 
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine holds that the government “may not 
deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected 
interests.”85  The doctrine reflects the principle that the government may not 
command indirectly what it is forbidden to command directly.86  For example, the 
Supreme Court determined that a federal law prohibiting educational broadcasting 
stations from editorializing in order to receive federal grant dollars was an 
unconstitutional condition.87  In Federal Communications Commission v. League of 
Women Voters of California,88 the Supreme Court reasoned that just as Congress 
could not directly command a broadcasting station to relinquish its First Amendment 
right to editorialize, Congress could not do so indirectly by conditioning a federal 
grant on the grantee’s willingness to surrender its right to Free Speech.89  In essence, 
the doctrine prevents the government from pressuring or coercing citizens into 
relinquishing a constitutional right in exchange for a gratuitous benefit.90
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine evolves each time the government 
devises an innovative means for conditioning benefits or privileges.   At the turn of 
the twentieth century, the Supreme Court first invoked the doctrine to prohibit states 
from conditioning economic liberties enjoyed by corporations on the corporations’ 
willingness to relinquish constitutional rights.91  Fifty years later, the doctrine 
reemerged to safeguard personal liberties.  For example, the Court ruled that the 
                                                                
85Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972).  Although Perry refrains from using the 
term “unconstitutional condition,” the opinion is subsequently cited by later Supreme Court 
decisions when defining the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.  See generally  O'Hare 
Truck Serv. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 716-17 (1996); Rutan v. Republican Party, 
497 U.S. 62, 69 (1990); FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 408 (1984) (White, 
J., dissenting).  
86Sullivan, supra note 11, at 1415. 
87League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 402.   
88Id. 
89Id. at 384.  The Supreme Court recently ruled that in some circumstances, the 
government can constitutionally condition how government grant money is spent.  In 
upholding a congressional mandate prohibiting a health care clinic from using federal dollars 
to counsel patients on abortion, the Court concluded that the Constitution did not prohibit 
Congress from choosing to fund one form of speech and not another.  See Rust v. Sullivan, 
500 U.S. 173 (1991).  Although this ruling seems to veer from the doctrine of unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine, it does not affect this note’s topic as the CFC funding is not designated 
from the federal budget; CFC dollars are raised from the income earned from federal 
employees.  
90Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 519 (1958) (holding that the denial of a tax exemption 
for veterans who engage in protected speech will have the effect of coercing the veterans into 
relinquishing their First Amendment rights). 
91Sullivan, supra note 11, at 1415.  Accord Cass. R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional 
Conditions Doctrine is an Anachronism (With Particular Reference to Religion, Speech, and 
Abortion), 70 B.U.L. REV. 593, 597 (1990). 
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government could not condition tax exemptions on the surrender of protected 
political speech, condition public employment on one’s association with a particular 
political party, or condition welfare benefits on consent to work on a religious 
Sabbath.92   
The most recent development of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, and one 
bearing direct relevance to the focus of this note, involves a government condition 
that individuals relinquish one constitutional right as a condition for exercising 
another right.  In Bourgeois v Peters, 93 the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the City of 
Columbus, Georgia imposed an unconstitutional condition when it required 
individuals to submit to an unreasonable body search, by means of metal detectors, 
as a condition of protesting a controversial military training school.94  Bourgeois 
developed the traditional doctrinal analysis by expanding the applicability of the 
doctrine to include not just conditions placed on gratuitous benefits, but to also 
conditions placed on constitutional rights.    
B.  Doctrinal Elements & Analytical Framework 
An unconstitutional conditions analysis begins with identifying two key 
elements: (1) a gratuitous government benefit, and (2) a threatened constitutional 
right.95  The “benefit” in an unconstitutional conditions problem encompasses any 
benefit that the government is “permitted but not compelled to provide,”96 such as 
federal grants, public employment, or social services.97  Although the government 
may withhold a gratuitous benefit altogether, it may not deny the benefit “on the 
basis that infringes [one’s] constitutionally protected interests . . . .”98  In the past 
                                                                
92Sullivan, supra note 11, at 1416; see generally Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980) 
(using the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions to prohibit a county public defender from 
terminating public employees because the employees were not affiliated with or sponsored by 
the Democratic Party); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (employing the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine to protect religious freedom in holding that the State of 
South Carolina unconstitutionally conditioned unemployment benefits on citizens’ willingness 
to work on a religious Sabbath); Speiser, 357 U.S. 513 (holding that the denial of a tax 
exemption for veterans who engage in protected speech will have the effect of coercing the 
veterans into relinquishing their First Amendment rights). 
93387 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2004). 
94Id. at 1324. 
95Sullivan, supra note 11, at 1422. 
96Id.  Sullivan notes that “current constitutional law treats most governmental benefits as 
‘gratuities:’ matters of political grace to be deferentially reviewed.” Id. 
97See generally League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 402 (recognizing that an Act which 
conditions receipt of a federal grant on the relinquishment of the right to editorialize imposes 
an unconstitutional condition on an educational broadcasting station); Perry, 408 U.S. at 597 
(ruling that a state requirement is an unconstitutional condition when the state required a non-
tenured professor to cease criticizing the Board of Reagents in order to maintain his 
employment with a state college); Sherbert, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (employing the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine to protect religious freedom when it held that the State of 
South Carolina unconstitutionally conditioned unemployment benefits on citizens’ willingness 
to work on a religious Sabbath). 
98Perry, 408 U.S. at 597.   
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half-century, government gratuities in unconstitutional conditions problems have 
fallen into one of two categories: exemptions from regulations, such as tax 
exemptions and land variances, or direct subsidies and other “government largesse,” 
such as unemployment benefits and federal grants.99  As explained above, in October 
2004, the Eleventh Circuit identified a third category of benefits subject to the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine—the privilege of exercising a constitutional 
right, such as the freedom of speech and assembly.100   
The second component of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is a 
“constitutional right” such as speech, religion, and property rights.101  These rights 
and the unconstitutional conditions by which they are burdened typically possess 
certain characteristics.  First, the condition used to limit the constitutional right 
presents an “either-or” choice, putting the benefit recipient in the position of having 
to choose either the constitutional right or the benefit.102  Thus, a situation in which 
federal grant dollars are distributed based on discriminatory criteria such as race or 
gender will not invoke the doctrine, as these are characteristics to which the benefit 
recipient has no choice.103  Accordingly, the second characteristic is that the choice to 
relinquish the right or forego the benefit be a “fork in the road [which lies] ahead 
rather than behind.”104  The doctrine is therefore more likely to emerge in situations 
where the condition takes on the form of a prerequisite.105  Finally, the constitutional 
interest that is being threatened must be a recognized constitutional right normally 
guarded by judicial review.106  Based on these doctrinal elements and characteristics, 
an unconstitutional condition is best summarized as a circumstance in which “the 
[g]overnment offers a benefit that it is constitutionally permitted but not compelled 
to offer, on condition that the recipient undertake (or refrain from) future action that 
                                                                
99Sullivan, supra note 11, at 1424-25; see also sources cited supra note 97; see generally 
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (holding that a municipal mandate which 
required a landowner to donate land to the city as a condition of receiving a variance violated 
the Fifth Amendment under the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions); Arkansas Writers' 
Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987) (holding the state could not condition a tax 
exemption on a publisher’s willingness to only publish religious, professional, trade, or sports 
periodicals).   
100Bourgeois, 387 F.3d at 1324.  This additional category contradicts Sullivan’s 
observation that the benefit in an unconstitutional condition is a gratuity that the government is 
not compelled to provide.  See Sullivan, supra note 11, at 1422.  However, the Eleventh 
Circuit poignantly noted that it was committed to barring any government condition which has 
the effect of chilling free speech.  387 F.2d at 1324. 
101Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668 (1996) (finding an unconstitutional 
condition when a municipality conditions the benefit of receiving government contracts on the 
contractor’s willingness to cease criticizing the local government).  See sources cited supra 
notes 97, 99. 
102Sullivan, supra note 11, at 1426. 
103Id. 
104Id. at 1427. 
105Id.   
106Id. 
14https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol53/iss4/8
2005-06] UNREASONABLE CONDITIONS 703 
is legal for him to undertake (or to refrain from) but that government could not have 
constitutionally compelled (or prohibited) without especially strong justification.”107
Following this definition, there are three steps in an unconstitutional condition 
analysis.  First, identify the benefit and determine whether the government is 
permitted but not constitutionally compelled to provide that benefit.108  Second, 
identify the constitutional right the individual is expected to relinquish in order to 
receive the benefit.109  In this step, make certain that the beneficiary is presented with 
a choice; if the condition is based on unalterable trait, such as race or gender, then 
the unconstitutional condition doctrine is not the appropriate analysis.110  Finally, 
determine whether constitutional standards would prohibit the government from 
directly restricting the constitutional right in question.111  If the analysis concludes 
that the government may not restrict the right directly, then the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine holds that the government may not condition receipt of the 
benefit on the relinquishment of the constitutional right.112  
V.  ANALYSIS OF CFC REQUIREMENT AS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITION 
The new CFC requirement imposes an unconstitutional condition by demanding 
charitable organizations sacrifice judicial supervision over administrative searches of 
their private business records as a condition of participating in the federal 
fundraising program.113  This condition evades the Fourth Amendment by coercing 
organizations into voluntarily producing information for which the government 
would otherwise need a subpoena.114   
Federal law prohibits any U.S. employer from employing or transacting with 
terrorists or terrorist organizations.115  If federal law enforcement officials reasonably 
suspect that any of the organizations participating in the CFC are employing a 
terrorist or transacting with terrorist organizations, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigations is fully authorized to investigate this alleged criminal conduct.116  
Federal agencies typically investigate suspected wrongdoing by issuing an 
administrative subpoena to compel production of information and documents 
relevant to the inquiry.117  The subpoenas are subject to judicial review as a means of 
                                                                
107Id. 
108Sullivan, supra note 11, at 1423-25. 
109Id. at 1426-27. 
110Id. at 1427. 
111Id. 
112Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385. 
113See generally Wolverton, supra note 3. 
114Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F.Supp.2d 471, 495 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
115Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001). 
116Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism, H.R. 3162, 108th  Cong., 115 Stat. 272, § 501(a) (2001) 
[hereinafter USA PATRIOT Act]. 
117Id.; see also Bailey, 228 F.3d at 346. 
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ensuring compliance with Fourth Amendment standards.118  The agency issuing the 
subpoena may either seek judicial approval prior to serving the subpoena, or, in the 
alternative, it may issue the subpoena without judicial approval, and the individual or 
company upon whom the subpoena is served may appeal the enforceability of the 
subpoena to a court.119   
Because the government has no reasonable belief that any of the organizations 
participating in the CFC are in fact employing terrorists,120 a government subpoena 
would not likely withstand a Fourth Amendment challenge.  Therefore, if the Fourth 
Amendment prohibits the OPM from obtaining this information directly, the doctrine 
of unconstitutional conditions prohibits the agency from obtaining the information 
indirectly.   
The paradigm unconstitutional condition is a government mandate requiring an 
individual to give up a constitutional right, such as speech or protection against an 
unreasonable search, in order to receive a benefit, such as a tax exemption, welfare 
benefits, or even a federal grant.  To fit neatly within this model, the CFC 
requirement would demand that the CFC charitable organizations permit the OPM to 
conduct ongoing searches of their private employee records without a subpoena.  The 
OPM, however, was far more clever in devising its condition.  Here, the government 
itself is not searching the private business records of the charitable agencies planning 
to participate in the CFC, but rather it is requiring the organizations to conduct the 
searches themselves and to turn over the names of individuals whose names match 
those on terrorist watch lists.   Notwithstanding this distinction, the result is the 
equivalent to the paradigm problem in that the government is achieving an ends that 
the Constitution otherwise prohibits.   
Using the framework provided in Part IV, the following analysis identifies 
participation in the CFC as the “benefit,” and the freedom from unreasonable 
searches as the “constitutional right.”  The analysis establishes that the Fourth 
Amendment would prohibit such government conduct if the requirement took on the 
form of a direct order rather than the form of a condition.  In sum, the analysis 
concludes that the OPM is offering the benefit of participating in the CFC, on 
condition that the recipient consent to an unreasonable search, an action that is legal 
for the organizations to consent to, but that the government could not constitutionally 
compel without violating Fourth Amendment protections.121
                                                                
118Ashcroft, 334 F.Supp.2d at 495. 
119Id. 
120Tim Kauffman, Dozen Charities Join ACLU in Protesting Watch-List Requirement, 
FED. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2004, at 8; see also CFC MEMORANDUM, supra note 41.  The OPM has 
not expressed any belief that organizations participating in the CFC are more likely to employ 
or fund terrorists than any other charitable organization.  Instead, the agency justifies the new 
rule as a means to ensure charities follow “best practices endorsed by the Administration’s 
anti-terrorism efforts and to provide information that will aid charities in achieving 
compliance with the law.”  Id. 
121See Sullivan, supra note 11, at 1427. 
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A.  Step #1:  Participation in the CFC is a “Benefit” 
The “benefit” component in an unconstitutional conditions problem is a 
gratuitous benefit that the government is permitted but not compelled to provide.122  
In the present fact pattern, the “benefit” is participation in the CFC.  The CFC is a 
charitable program offered by the federal government with the gratuitous purpose of  
“support[ing] and facilitat[ing] fund-raising on behalf of voluntary agencies through 
on the job solicitations of Federal employees.”123 Although the administration of the 
CFC is authorized by executive order,124 the Constitution does not mandate that the 
government host the fundraising drive.125  Therefore, the benefit of participating in 
the CFC satisfies the first component of the unconstitutional conditions analysis 
because it is a gratuitous program that the government is permitted, but not 
compelled, to provide. 
The typical “benefit” in an unconstitutional conditions problem is generally some 
form of a government largesse or exemption from a regulation.  In the present fact 
pattern, the benefit takes the form of the constitutional right to free speech.126  
Although the benefit of participating in the CFC appears to deviate from a benefit in 
a typical unconstitutional conditions problem, the Eleventh Circuit recently ruled that 
conditioning the benefit of protected speech is particularly deserving of heightened 
protection for the very reason that it is a constitutional right.127  In Bourgeois v. 
Peters,128 the City of Columbus, Georgia instituted a policy that required individuals 
to submit to a metal detector search prior to demonstrating on public property, 
outside of the gates of a U.S. Army base.129  In addition to ruling that this 
requirement violates both the First and Fourth Amendments, the court also described 
this requirement as a “classic ‘unconstitutional condition,’ in which the government 
conditions receipt of a benefit or privilege on the relinquishment of a constitutional 
                                                                
122Id. at 1422. 
123Exec. Order No. 12,353, 47 Fed. Reg. 12,785 (Mar. 23, 1982).  
124Id. 
125Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 791-92.  The CFC does not fulfill any constitutional obligation 
imposed on the executive branch.  Rather, it is the product of President Eisenhower’s forward 
thinking objective to simplify the fundraising process for both the donors and the solicitors in 
the federal workplace.  See supra text accompanying notes 24-33. 
126Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 799. 
127Bourgeois, 387 F.3d at 1324. 
128Id. at 1303.  
129Id. at 1307.  “The plaintiffs in this case are an organization called ‘School of the 
Americas Watch’ (SAW) and several of its members, including SAW's founder, Rev. Roy 
Bourgeois. The group engages in various forms of nonviolent protest, seeking to pressure the 
federal government to cut funding to the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security 
Cooperation, better known as the ‘School of the Americas’ (SOA). The SOA is run by the 
United States Army and housed at Fort Benning, Georgia. It trains military leaders from other 
countries throughout the Western Hemisphere in combat and various counterinsurgency 
techniques. SAW contends that the SOA bolsters military dictatorships by training their 
leaders how to kill, to torture, and otherwise to suppress their citizens.”  Id. at 1306. 
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right.”130  The court noted that the city’s new search requirement was an “especially 
malignant unconstitutional condition” because not only did the city require citizens 
to relinquish a constitutional right in order to receive a governmental benefit, the city 
required citizens to relinquish a constitutional right, freedom from unreasonable 
searches, in order to exercise other constitutional rights, the freedoms of speech and 
assembly.131  
Like the City of Columbus, the OPM is conditioning the benefit of one 
constitutional right, protected speech in the form of CFC fundraising, on the groups’ 
willingness to relinquish Fourth Amendment protections.  Following the rationale of 
the Eleventh Circuit, the OPM is, in effect, coercing the CFC organizations into 
choosing one constitutional right over another.  This type of coercion is prohibited 
under the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.132
B.  Step #2: Requirement to Relinquish Fourth Amendment Rights 
The “constitutional right” component in an unconstitutional conditions analysis is 
a recognized constitutional right that the beneficiary must forego in order to receive 
the gratuitous governmental benefit.133  Although an individual or organization may 
waive their constitutional rights on their own accord, the government may not 
command or coerce individuals into relinquishing these fundamental rights.134  In the 
past 50 years, the federal courts have considered unconstitutional condition cases 
involving rights guaranteed by the First,135 Fourth,136 and Fifth Amendments.137   
In the present fact pattern, the OPM is seeking information from private business 
records in violation of the Fourth Amendment.  The “condition” in this fact pattern 
requires organizations to compare the names of their employees to names listed on 
terrorist watch lists, and to then to notify the OPM when there is a match.138  This 
requirement is the equivalent of the OPM issuing an administrative subpoena to all 
10,000 organizations who participate in the CFC each year, ordering the 
organizations to continuously report personnel information contained in private 
business records for as long as the groups opt to participate in the CFC.  Such a 
subpoena is subject to a Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard by means of 
judicial review.139  However, by conditioning a governmental benefit on the 
                                                                
130Id. at 1324. 
131Id.  
132Id. 
133Sullivan, supra note 11, at 1427. 
134Id. 
135See supra note 92. 
136Bourgeois, 387 F.3d at 1324; see also Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) (using the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine to analyze the constitutionality of a condition which 
required home visits in order to receive welfare benefits; the Court ultimately ruled that the 
home visit was not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment).   
137Dolan, 512 U.S. 374. 
138Liptak, supra note 5. 
139Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 495. 
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organizations’ willingness to voluntarily produce information that would otherwise 
require a subpoena, the OPM has effectively side-stepped the judicial hurdles that the 
Fourth Amendment would otherwise pose in the government’s quest for this 
information.  Consequently, this new condition for continued participation in the 
CFC emulates that of an unconstitutional condition because the condition requires 
the organizations to voluntarily surrender Fourth Amendment protections by 
producing information that the government would otherwise need a subpoena to 
obtain.   
The condition of comparing employee records against terrorist watch lists 
encompasses the characteristics typically seen in unconstitutional conditions.140  The 
condition presents a choice to the organizations: compare employee lists to terrorist 
watch lists or forego future participation in the CFC.  The choice to relinquish the 
right or forego participation is a decision the organizations will face every year, thus 
the “fork in the road” lies ahead.141  And finally, the constitutional interest, freedom 
of unreasonable government searches, amounts to a preferred right subject to judicial 
review.142
C.  Step #3:  Constitutional Analysis of the CFC Requirement Under the Fourth 
Amendment 
Before embarking upon the constitutional analysis of the new CFC requirement 
under the Fourth Amendment, it is useful to review the first two steps of the 
unconstitutional conditions analysis.  The first component of the analysis is the 
“benefit,” or “privilege” as described by the Eleventh Circuit, of exercising protected 
speech by participating in the CFC.  The second component, the “constitutional 
right,” is the Fourth Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable search.  The 
final stage of analysis in the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is to determine 
whether or not the OPM is indeed violating the Constitution when it requires certain 
non-profit organizations to voluntarily “search” their business records without 
judicial oversight, or whether this search is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.  
If the act is reasonable, then the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions does not bar 
its enforcement.  However, as the following analysis concludes, the search is not 
reasonable within the parameters of the Fourth Amendment, and the courts have no 
choice but to prohibit further enforcement of the regulation. 
1.  The Fourth Amendment and Administrative Searches 
Americans cherish their right to privacy, a right which, in part, stems from the 
Fourth Amendment.143  The Fourth Amendment “safeguard[s] the privacy and 
security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials,”144  by 
protecting against “unreasonable searches and seizures.”145  To ensure that law 
                                                                
140See Sullivan, supra note 11, at 1426-27. 
141Id. 
142Id. 
143William C. Banks and M.E. Bowman, Executive Authority for National Security 
Surveillance, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 2 (2000).   
144Camara v. Mun. Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967). 
145U.S. CONST. amend. IV.   
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enforcement agencies comply with the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court has 
interpreted the Fourth Amendment as mandating “adherence to judicial processes.”146  
To determine the reasonableness of a search, courts typically balance the privacy 
interests of the individual being searched against the promotion of a legitimate 
governmental interest.147  Typically, this balance is reached by requiring law 
enforcement agents to obtain judicial warrants based on probable cause prior to 
searching a person or her property.148  Searches conducted in the absence of a 
warrant or probable cause are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment 
unless the search falls within one of the Amendment’s few exceptions.149  An 
administrative subpoena is one of those exceptions.150
Administrative subpoenas are searches conducted for administrative reasons 
rather than the purpose of investigating a crime.151  Although still subject to the 
Fourth Amendment, the courts hold these types of searches to the less stringent 
standard of “reasonableness,” rather than the probable cause standard to which a 
typical search warrant is subject.152  In order for an administrative subpoena to 
comply with the reasonableness standard, the subpoena must, (1) fall within the 
authority of the agency, (2) not make too indefinite a demand, and (3) seek only 
reasonably relevant information.153  This reasonableness requirement ensures that 
administrative subpoenas are used for a legitimate governmental purpose, as 
mandated by the Fourth Amendment, and not exploited as “arbitrary fishing 
expeditions.”154
2.  The New CFC Requirement is Unreasonable Under the Fourth Amendment 
If the OPM used an administrative subpoena as the means to identify employees 
whose names match those on terrorist watch lists, rather than seeking the information 
by conditioning a gratuitous benefit, the agency’s subpoena would not satisfy the 
Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard.  It is helpful to understand the nature of 
administrative subpoenas when considering this reasonableness standard.  
Administrative subpoenas fuel the government’s investigative power, but they are 
strictly limited by the fact that they are only enforceable by a court.155  Thus, when 
an agency issues a subpoena to compel documents in relation to an investigation of 
                                                                
146Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). 
147Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979). 
148Id. 
149Katz, 389 U.S. at 357. 
150Ashcroft, 334 F.Supp. 2d at 495. 
151Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 506 (1978); see generally Ashcroft, 334 F.Supp. 2d at 
495 (explaining that the Fourth Amendment is not confined to literal searches of private 
homes, but it extends also to constructive searches such as administrative subpoenas). 
152Gimbal v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 77 F.3d 593, 596 (2d Cir. 1996). 
153United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950). 
154United States v. Bailey (In re Subpoena Duces Tecum), 228 F.3d 342, 349 (4th Cir. 
2000) (citing United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 299 (1991)).   
155Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. at 642-43.   
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possible wrongdoing, the subpoena recipient is entitled to appeal the subpoena and 
obtain a judicial opinion before the recipient is obligated to comply with the 
subpoena mandates.156  Most commonly, these subpoenas are used by agencies with 
investigative and enforcement powers, such as the Federal Bureau of 
Investigations,157 the Occupational Health and Safety Administration,158 and the 
Federal Trade Commission.159   
The Supreme Court observes that the Fourth Amendment reasonableness 
standard for administrative subpoenas (“within the authority of the agency, the 
demand is not too indefinite, and the information sought is reasonably relevant”160) 
should not be reduced to a formula, because "relevancy and adequacy or excess in 
the breadth of the subpoena are matters variable in relation to the nature, purposes 
and scope of the inquiry."’161  Using the analysis provided by the Supreme Court, it 
is unmistakably clear that if the OPM had used a subpoena to compel information 
rather than threatening to revoke the privilege of participation in the CFC, the agency 
would not satisfy the reasonableness standard.   
a.  The Information Sought is Not Within the Authority of the Agency 
Neither Congress nor the Constitution confers the OPM the authority to 
command private employers to produce information regarding which of their 
employees have names appearing on terrorist watch lists.  The OPM is an 
independent executive agency, created in 1978 to replace the United States Civil 
Service Commission.162  The agency functions as the human resources department 
for the executive and legislative branches by “serving as the main portal for 
employment information and connecting job applicants with Federal agencies and 
departments.”163  The agency’s director serves as an advisor to the President of the 
United States on matters concerning civilian employment, and is generally charged 
with executing Civil Service Rules.164  When the agency assumed the tasks of the 
Civil Service Commission, it took on the responsibility of overseeing the CFC.165  
The OPM has no regulatory authority over private corporations in this country, non-
profit or otherwise, other than to validate that certain charitable organizations meet 
                                                                
156Bailey, 228 F.3d at 348. 
157See USA PATRIOT Act, supra note 116, at § 501(a). 
158United States v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc., 84 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1996) (finding that the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration has the authority to issue an administrative 
subpoena against an employer for the purpose of investigating violations of workplace health 
and safety laws). 
159Oklahoma Press Publ’g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 199 (1946) (noting that Congress 
conferred subpoena powers to the Federal Trade Commission for investigative purposes).  
160Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. at 652. 
161Bailey, 228 F.3d at 347 (citing Oklahoma Press Publ’g Co., 327 U.S. at 209). 
162Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 792-93. 
163OPM GOALS, supra note 19. 
1645 U.S.C.A. § 1103(a)(7) (West 1996). 
165Cornelius, 473 U.S. at  793.  
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the definition of a “health and welfare organization” in order to satisfy the CFC 
eligibility requirements.166   
Noticeably absent from the authority and duties assigned to the OPM is any law 
enforcement or intelligence gathering powers, specifically, the authority to identify 
terrorists working for private non-profit corporations.167  The courts have placed 
considerable importance on the fact that agencies that do issue administrative 
subpoenas only do so under the express authority of Congress and for a purpose that 
Congress may order.168  Here, the OPM is not operating under the authority of 
Congress.  Instead, it derives its authority to implement this requirement from an 
executive order and its plenary authority to administer the CFC.169
b.  Requirement is Too Indefinite and Not Reasonable in Scope 
The Supreme Court maintains that in order to comply with Fourth Amendment 
standards, administrative searches and subpoenas will be disallowed if they are not 
“suitably specific and properly limited in [their] scope.”170  The requirement of 
actively comparing employee names against terrorist watch lists is too indefinite in 
time and unduly burdensome to satisfy the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment.  First, the mandate, whether by subpoena or as a condition of 
participating in the CFC, is quite literally indefinite in time, as the non-profit groups 
who participate in the CFC must regularly comply with this requirement for as long 
as they choose to continue to fundraise through the program.  Second, under this new 
requirement, the charitable organizations participating in the CFC are expected to 
assume an unduly burdensome task that no other non-profit agency is required to 
undertake.  Although the OPM asserts that this requirement is consistent with the 
Treasury Guidelines for charitable organizations,171 just the opposite is true.  The 
Treasury Guidelines do not suggest that charitable organizations compare their 
employee lists to names on terrorist watch lists.  Rather, the Guidelines advise that 
only those agencies distributing funds to foreign organizations verify that the foreign 
                                                                
1665 C.F.R. §§ 950.201 – 950.203 (2005). 
1675 C.F.R. § 950; see also OPM GOALS, supra note 19. 
168Bailey, 228 F.3d at 349; see also United States v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 995 F. Supp. 
1460 (M.D. Fla. 1998) (ruling the Department of Defense Inspector General was within its 
authority to subpoena documents from Lockheed Martin Corp. that directly related to an 
investigation of possible overcharges in connection with a government contract to which 
Lockheed Martin was a party); EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54 (1984) (holding that the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Office could lawfully subpoena private business records 
which directly related to an authorized agency investigation; the Court noted that the EEOC is 
only entitled to subpoena documents that are relevant to the unlawful practice the agency is 
investigating under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act). 
169CFC MEMORANDUM, supra note 41; Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 
(Sept. 23, 2001) (providing that the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the 
Secretary of State and the Attorney General shall promulgate rules and regulations to carry out 
the order, and that all other agencies shall take appropriate measures within their authority to 
carry out the provisions of the order). 
170Bailey, 228 F.3d at 347 (quoting Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 376 (1911)). 
171CFC MEMORANDUM, supra note 41; see also TREASURY GUIDELINES, supra note 46. 
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organizations do not appear on terrorist watch lists.172  With regard to maintaining 
personnel records on employees, the Treasury Guidelines advise that U.S. charitable 
organizations maintain basic personnel records that include home addresses and 
social security records—information that most organizations already keep on file.173   
Although federal law prohibits employing or transacting in any way with 
terrorists, Congress has not yet imposed an affirmative duty on all employers to 
continuously compare their private employee records to terrorist watch lists and to 
report any possible matches to the federal government.174  The charities fundraising 
in the CFC are being held to an unduly burdensome standard simply because they are 
exercising their constitutionally protected right to participate in the CFC.  This 
requirement, both indefinite in time and burdensome in scope, is far too sweeping to 
meet the reasonableness requirement guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.   
c. The Information Sought Lacks Relevancy 
The reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment requires that 
administrative searches not exceed purposes relevant to the inquiry.175  The CFC 
requirement, whether in the form of a subpoena or an unconstitutional condition, 
contains no relevance to the purpose of the OPM or its administration of the CFC.  
As stated above, this agency serves as the human resources department for the 
executive and legislative branches.176  In carrying out the duties of this role, the 
director of the OPM is authorized by the President to “make arrangements for 
voluntary health and welfare agencies to solicit contributions from Federal 
employees.”177  Federal regulations authorize the OPM to collect certain information 
relevant to the eligibility and financial accountability of the groups participating in 
the CFC, such as verification of the organizations’ tax-exempt status and overhead 
costs.178  The new requirement of comparing employee names to those on terrorist 
watch lists bears no relevance to either an organization’s eligibility to participate in 
the CFC, or an organization’s financial accountability, and therefore falls outside the 
parameters of the Fourth Amendment.   
                                                                
172TREASURY GUIDELINES, supra note 46, at 6. 
173Id. at 3.  Employers will have the full names, addresses and social security numbers of 
their employees on employee taxation forms (“W-4 form”) required by the Internal Revenue 
Service, and Employment Eligibility Verification forms (“I-9 form”) required by the 
Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service. 
174See 31 C.F.R. §595 (2005).  U.S. persons are prohibited from dealing in property or 
property interests of a “specially designated terrorist,” including making any contribution of 
funds to such individuals.  31 C.F.R. § 595.204 (2005).  Employers have no general 
affirmative duty to actively compare names of employees against terrorist watch lists.  But see 
Shawna S. Baker, 9/11 Executive Order has Bigtime Consequences for Oklahoma Employers, 
11 OKLA. EMP. L. LETTER 8 (Aug. 2003) (interpreting Executive Order No. 13,224 to require 
“employers to actively fight the war on terrorism by crosschecking their employees’ names 
against those identified by U.S. authorities”). 
175Bailey, 228 F.3d at 349 (quoting Oklahoma Press Publ’g Co., 327 U.S. at 209). 
176OPM GOALS, supra note 19. 
177Exec. Order No. 12,353, 47 Fed. Reg. 12,785 (Mar. 25, 1982). 
1785 C.F.R. § 950.202(b) (2004). 
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For the abovementioned reasons, the new condition placed on non-profit 
organizations participating in the CFC is unconstitutional.  By conditioning an 
organization’s participation in the CFC on its willingness to produce information for 
which a federal agency would otherwise need a subpoena, the OPM has effectively 
evaded its obligations imposed by the Constitution.  As the government could not 
otherwise obtain this information directly, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions 
forbids it from obtaining the information indirectly.  The doctrine of unconstitutional 
conditions stands as a bar to this type of government coercion, and courts should 
recognize this act as an “arbitrary fishing expedition”179 and prohibit the OPM from 
further enforcing the rule. 
VI.  JUSTIFICATION FOR DECLARING THE NEW CFC REQUIREMENT 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
There are three additional arguments which lend further support to the conclusion 
that this new requirement is unconstitutional:  (1) this type of condition is 
particularly malignant, (2) the Constitution governs equally in times of peace and 
war, and (3) the terrorist watch lists are wholly unreliable. 
A. “[A]n Especially Malignant Unconstitutional Condition”180
As the Eleventh Circuit so aptly declared, when the government mandates 
citizens to relinquish one constitutional right as a condition of exercising another 
constitutional right, that condition “presents an especially malignant unconstitutional 
condition.”181  While the unconstitutional conditions analysis revealed that 
participation in the CFC is a benefit that the government is permitted but not 
constitutionally compelled to provide, the Supreme Court has ruled that the act of 
participating in the CFC is also protected speech.182  By conditioning the charitable 
organizations’ exercise of this right on the willingness to relinquish protections of 
the Fourth Amendment, the OPM has devised a plan to subtly pressure these 
organizations into surrendering a constitutionally protected freedom.   
The OPM stated that the purpose of this new requirement is to “ensure that 
charities follow best practices endorsed by the Administration’s anti-terrorism efforts 
and to provide information that will aid charities in achieving compliance with the 
law.”183  To the contrary, this requirement re-designates a far more expansive 
interpretation of the voluntary guidelines issued by the Department of Treasury into 
a condition of exercising protected speech.  The Department of Treasury specifically 
notes that its guidelines “do not supersede or modify legal requirements applicable to 
non-profit institutions.”184  Furthermore, the Treasury Guidelines do not recommend 
                                                                
179Bailey, 228 F.3d at 349. 
180Bourgeois, 387 F.3d at 1324. 
181Id. 
182Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 799. 
183CFC MEMORANDUM, supra note 41; see also TREASURY GUIDELINES, supra note 46. 
184OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, INTRODUCTION TO 
TREASURY’S ANTI-TERRORIST FINANCING GUIDELINES: VOLUNTARY BEST PRACTICES FOR U.S.-
BASED CHARITIES, available at http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/keyissues/protecting 
/charities-intro.shtml (last visited Aug. 1, 2005). 
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that charities actually engage in an ongoing comparison of employee names to names 
found on terrorist watch lists, but rather that any organization who distributes funds 
to foreign recipient organizations be prepared to “demonstrate that it verified that the 
foreign recipient organization does not appear on any [terrorist watch list] of the U.S. 
Government, the United Nations, or the European Union.”185  Using this glaring 
misinterpretation of the Treasury’s Guidelines as the justification to coerce charitable 
organizations into surrendering either their First or Fourth Amendment protections is 
an egregious act, and courts should be vigilant in prohibiting the OPM from further 
enforcing the rule. 
B.  The Constitution is Equal in Times of War and Peace 
The Constitution serves the purpose of balancing government authority and 
citizens’ rights.186  Defending against the threat of future terrorist attacks presents a 
delicate challenge to a free society, namely “how to prevent and punish 
ideologically-motivated violence without infringing on political freedoms and civil 
liberties.”187  This clash between liberties and national defense sprung to life most 
recently after the attacks on September 11, 2001.  The executive branch vigorously 
sought to expand its intelligence gathering and law enforcement powers as a means 
to better equip itself to hunt and capture terrorists.188  The legislative branch, in an 
effort to show its unwavering support of deterring and punishing terrorist acts in the 
United States, enacted the USA PATRIOT Act,189 which provided the executive 
branch with the powers it sought.190  The judiciary is now left with the most vital role 
of determining what government acts fall within the parameters of the Constitution 
and what government acts do not.  This notion of “emergency constitutionalism”191 is 
not a new debate, and will likely continue as the nation decides what liberties it will 
sacrifice in the interest of national security.  Nevertheless, longstanding Supreme 
                                                                
185TREASURY GUIDELINES, supra note 46, at 6. 
186Mark G. Young, Note, What Big Eyes and Ears You Have!: A New Regime for Covert 
Governmental Surveillance, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1017, 1020 (2001). 
187DAVID COLE & JAMES X. DEMPSEY, TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION 1 (2002). 
188Id. at 15.  In  reference to the USA PATRIOT Act, the authors write, “Attorney General 
John Ashcroft, its principal proponent, exerted extraordinary pressure, essentially threatening 
Congress that the blood of the victims of future terrorist attacks would be on its hands if it did 
not swiftly enact the Administration’s proposals.”  See J.M. Lawrence, War on Terrorism; 
Anti-terror Laws in Place; Feds Urgently Implement Crackdown, BOSTON HERALD, Oct. 27, 
2001, at 5 (reporting that the USA PATRIOT Act was introduced just five days after the 9/11 
attacks and was one of the “swiftest-moving” bills in federal legislative history).  
189The Act’s introduction states, “To deter and punish terrorist acts in the United States 
and around the world, to enhance law enforcement investigatory tools, and for other 
purposes.”  USA PATRIOT Act, supra note 116; see also Bob Kemper & Jeff Zeleny, 
President Signs Bill Widening Powers for Police, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 27, 2001, at N1. 
190See USA PATRIOT Act, supra note 116. 
191Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029 (2004) (contending 
that because terrorist attacks are more likely to occur again with the development of 
technology, it is more important than ever to determine whether an actual attack is necessary 
to trigger a state of emergency or whether the looming threat is enough). 
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Court precedent holds that the Constitution rules “equally in war and in peace, and 
covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times, and under all 
circumstances.”192   
The OPM is not only governing outside its authority as permitted by Congress, 
but it is imposing a condition that falls outside the parameters of the Constitution.  
Notwithstanding the agency’s goal to support the Administration’s effort to curb 
future terrorist attacks, the OPM, administering the CFC under the powers of 
executive branch, is bound by the limitations imposed by the Constitution.  If the 
OPM, or any government agency, suspects that a non-profit agency is employing or 
funding terrorists, then any effort to thwart this illegal activity must be conducted 
solely within the powers afforded by the Constitution.    
C.  Terrorist Watch Lists are Wholly Unreliable 
The reliability of the terrorist watch lists have posed dreadful problems for 
citizens who have the misfortune of having their name appear on one of these lists, 
either by coincidence or mistake.193  As described above, problems with these lists 
include common names without specific identification such as birth dates, addresses, 
or social security numbers,194 non-uniform standards to update the lists and maintain 
list privacy,195 and finally, no effective procedure for having a name removed once it 
is discovered that a name has been mistakenly added to a list.196  The gravest concern 
of the use of these lists as a means for determining which charitable organizations 
can participate in the CFC is the known possibility of a false positive.197  If an 
organization finds that a job applicant or an employee has a name matching one of 
the names on these lists, the organization is put in the position of either not hiring or 
terminating the individual, or foregoing the opportunity to participate in the CFC.198  
Given the number of problems that the Department of Homeland Security Inspector 
General has identified in compiling and maintaining a list of individuals and 
organizations known to pose terrorist threats, it is unsound policy to permit the OPM 
to use these lists as an impediment to free speech. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The efforts of the U.S. government to curb terrorism, particularly after the 
devastating attacks on September 11, 2001, have given rise to numerous debates over 
                                                                
192Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 120-21 (1866). 
193See Romero, supra note 1; Sara Kehaulani Goo, Hundreds Report Watch-List Trials; 
Some Ended Hassles at Airports by Making Slight Change to Name, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 
2004, at A08 (reporting that in the month of July 2004 alone, more than 250 airline passengers 
filled out forms notifying the government that their names are mistakenly listed on the 
Transportation Security Administration no-fly list). 
194See supra text accompanying notes 62-67. 
195DHS INSPECTOR GEN. REPORT, supra note 57, at 27. 
196See Goo, supra note 193 (reporting on the numerous problems individuals have faced in 
clearing up the misidentification of their names on terrorist watch lists). 
197See supra text accompanying notes 1-3. 
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how best to protect American citizens within Constitutional boundaries.199  In an 
effort to support the Administration’s anti-terrorism efforts, the OPM decided to 
condition participation in the nation’s largest workplace fundraising drive200 on 
charitable organizations’ agreement to search private business records for names of 
employees matching those listed on terrorist watch lists.  Notwithstanding the 
unreliability of these lists, and the Fourth Amendment standards governing the 
acquisition of such information, the OPM stands firm that this new requirement is a 
necessary safeguard to securing Americans from terrorism.  This recent mandate of 
the OPM sparks yet another constitutional debate in the ongoing deliberation of how 
best to provide security from future terrorist acts while properly protecting our civil 
liberties.201   
Central to the constitutional discussions revolving around the war on terror is the 
fundamental question of whether anti-terrorism measures, such as the CFC 
requirement, truly make us safer as a society.  Given that the government has no 
grounds to suspect CFC organizations are more likely to employ or fund terrorists 
than those organizations not participating in the CFC, there is no compelling 
justification for imposing this requirement on these particular charities.  Rather than 
making a meaningful contribution to securing freedom, this new requirement is more 
likely to result in the blacklisting of innocent people from employment,202 and the 
drainage of resources from the organizations that provide much needed health and 
human services to our communities. 
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions prohibits the government from 
conditioning a gratuitous benefit on the requirement that the beneficiary relinquish a 
constitutional right.203  Since the OPM could not directly obtain the information it 
seeks without violating the Fourth Amendment, then the doctrine forbids the agency 
from acquiring the information indirectly by commanding groups to produce it as a 
condition of participating in the CFC.  Because the OPM imposed an 
unconstitutional condition on the 10,000 CFC charities when it implemented the new  
requirement, the federal courts should declare the requirement unconstitutional and 
prohibit further enforcement of the rule. 
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